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2020 – The Year of 
the Virus. 
SARS 2 / COVID 19
Frank Ruda & 
Agon Hamza
Introduction
It is more than trivial to note that 2020 could have turned out to be(come) 
just another year, just one of those calendrical dates of which the world 
has seen so many already. Years that in advance may have given rise to 
expectations only to forget or forcefully obliviate them in their unfolding 
or to replace them with forms of disappointment that create newer, 
sometimes lowered, sometimes heightened expectations. 2020 could 
have become a year to take a rare and merely arbitrary and coincidental 
constellation of calendrical dates as opportunity for thought: since in 
2020 we could all of reflected on what it may mean to celebrate Hegel’s 
and Hölderlin’s 250th anniversary in the same year in which we celebrate 
Engel’s 200th and Lenin’s 150th. Such a peculiar concatenation of 
the birthdays and anticipated later birthdates of absolute idealism, 
dialectical poetry, and two of the most influential and significant forms 
of (dialectical) materialism in the 20th century, to use highly abstract 
and poorly informative labels here for the purpose of brevity, could itself 
have presented a chance for speculative genealogies, reconsidered 
filiations and self-correcting self-critiques that may have led into burning 
questions of dialectical thinking that are still pressing today. But (very) 
little of (and almost no time for) this in 2020. 
2020 also could have turned into a year in which, speaking in broad, 
and potentially even only vaguely political terms, we could have followed, 
endorsed, been enthusiasm, disgusted, or disappointed by the processes 
happening on a representational and state level, especially – depending 
on one’s leaning or interpretation of them – if one were to consider them 
significant enough to determine the future of a country, of a continent 
or the entire planet. The elections held in the USA, in Bolivia, Kosovo, 
Poland, and New Zealand, to name but a few, may each belong in one or 
more of the above-mentioned categories. All these would have happened 
alongside, against the background of, in support of, or in stark contrast 
to the referendum in Chile, the yellow vests, Hong Kong protests, Brexit, 
LQBTQ+ movement(s), persistent climate change activism and rebellion, 
anticipated and devastating conflagrations, disastrous storms, some of 
which may have led to novel and media-orchestrated pseudo-decisions to 
plan changing things at some point in the not too distant future. 
Yet, 2020 turned out quite differently; it turned into a year in which 
a virus became the real protagonist (or antagonist) and that immediately 
on a number of different levels. Economically, the virus did produce 
some astounding effects – it precipitated “the largest economic 
shock of our lifetimes”, as Goldman Sachs commented.1 For the first 
time in at least a hundred years – recall that in April 1920 the previous 










































and state-defended halt brought to the national and international 
market dynamic and therewith to economic growth in many countries. 
For months we witnessed a suspension of previously untouchable 
economic credos and a pandemic forcing measures upon all kinds of 
governments that some wished should have been forced upon them by 
emancipatory movements long ago. This was not only a demonstration 
that actions were possible that previously were repeatedly deemed not 
possible, even though this is an undeniable fact. But the virus thereby 
also and contingently produced what previously was supposed to 
be the conscious action of an emancipatory organization or agent, 
notably an increasing condensation of the existing contradictions – 
which was therefore previously referred to as politicization. But can 
viruses politicize in this sense of the term? Did the virus operate like an 
unwilling Leninist party? Certainly not. Yet, it produced a crisis, a crisis 
of a new and different type, and this very crisis produced a series of 
unanticipated insights.
One was that states can operate not only as protectors and 
guardians of capital, but also for other purposes, including that they 
can actually stop or determine capital fluctuations and become the 
guardians and protectors of the people – even though there are many 
debates to be had on that front. States appeared to effectively protect 
their populations when they did not simply liberate themselves from 
economic prerogatives, but when they served as (un)willing instruments 
of scientifically produced knowledge (or they did not, when they decide 
not to). Another insight was that it seems necessary to have a debate 
around, ultimately, can counted and in the situation of crisis was counted 
as “essential work” and what should, can or did not.3 Even though this 
discussion mostly remained latent and implicit, this might have been 
something that could have been politicized: what can count as relevant 
work for and within a society, what kind of work does a society deem 
useless or what kind does it regard as a luxury that it nonetheless would 
never want to give up on.4 Even though, the acclamation-rituals, i.e. 
people applauding the workers deemed essential were quite present at 
first they subsequently disappeared, even though promises were made 
that, if we are once living under ameliorated conditions these conditions 
would also certainly imply an improvement of the working conditions 
of the “essential workers” (many of them working in lesser or even low 
paid jobs thus far), this was forgotten almost immediately when things 
calmed down a little and then (i.e., now) things got worse again (at least 
in Europe).
3 Hallward 2020
4 In this sense, Hegel for example referred to philosophy as being luxury – and otherwise being a 
harsh critique of luxury and the more trivial and material sense of the term (as sign of depravity and 
decadence). 
***
At the beginning of his recent book Corona, Climate, Chronic Emergency, 
Andreas Malm addresses another insight by raising the question as to 
“why… the states of the global North act on corona but not on climate?... 
The question was discussed on the online forums to which humanity 
was condemned in March.”5 Why did “states in advanced capitalist 
countries got so relatively fired up about the virus”?6 The list of ultimately 
unconvincing reasons Malm discusses is long. To name but a few: some 
argued that only Covid presents a real problem, not climate change 
(which is obviously wrong), others that Covid presents a more serious 
danger than climate change, a thesis hardly tenable, especially when 
taking into account the moment at which governments started rushing 
to act; at that precise point in time they did not have any appropriate 
scientific knowledge on their side and “virtually every aspect of the 
disease”7 was still uncertain, whereas the science on climate change 
is solid and long established. Some argued that climate change is 
not visible, but it is hard not to see that viruses are no less apparent; 
some argued that climate change is gradual and Corona appeared as a 
sudden explosion, but a storm or a locust attack does not appear less 
explosive or sudden. Is it the mortality rates then? This is also not a very 
convincing explanation, simply because the climate crisis mortality rates 
will be far higher than the ones expected because of the virus (and no 
one knew how high the rates will turn out to be when the state actions 
began). So what was it that made the states act so swiftly? When these 
deaths appeared in the center of the advanced Western world, something 
changed. When those who otherwise do not have much to fear could more 
or less justifiably get anxious and no one knew if even the most advanced 
existing health care systems, those of and in rich countries will be 
sufficiently equipped to care for their respective populations, something 
changed in the general Western risk assessment. One is justified to act if 
one might become a direct victim otherwise. 
This is to say, this time it did not happen elsewhere, not in some 
place that one could calmly identify from the distance as a hotspot of 
something terrible going on. The virus became (for the West) a truly global 
virus, when the threat was a threat to the West, when it did not threaten 
only threaten the poor displayed almost a negative egalitarian disregard 
for particularities – even though it thrives less on the young. Obviously, 
and more obviously than for a long time, it helps if you are rich and it 
super-helps if you are super-rich – and it, without any doubt, immediately 
did not simply stop capitalism as such. Zoom’s, Skype’s, and similar 








































communication software’s market value skyrocketed, as did that of 
HelloFresh and especially Amazon, for that matter. The virus did therefore 
not suspend the incentives to discover new field for value production or 
extraction. It did also not make everything better and greener by stopping 
some things that were otherwise omnipresent for a little while – it was 
clear that it could not take long until someone instrumentalized the 
pandemic for a political coup or for an increasing of value extraction.
But the point we want to make here is that the pandemic became a 
real problem when it seemed as if not even wealth could provide anyone 
with an absolute guarantee of survival and when the virus did not concern 
some particularities alone (like with the HIV/AIDS pandemic that led 
to all kinds of pathologizations of its victims, such as stigmatizations 
of gender choices, sexual orientations or entire “lifestyles”), but was a 
universal, one-world threat. Maybe the first vision of the world that has 
emerged since the meagre one of so called “globalisation”. But does this 
mean this is a virus that attacks mankind and that therefore can only be 
combated by mankind working together? The still ongoing race to get 
a vaccine up to scale and widely available (even though, now there is a 
potential winner) might symptomatically bring out in what direction we 
are heading, since the prospect of privatizing something everyone needs 
is certainly one of the more horrifying aspects of the current situation. 
Therefore it seems imperative to learn what Mike Davis called the right 
lessons from this global pandemic that could point to a way if not out, 
but to one that might lead to a slight amelioration of the situation or 
might at least not be simply identical to a parachute-free skydive into 
the abyss.8 Not only is it more than ever relevant to defend science and 
scientificity, and not only must in situations like these – and in this sense, 
the current pandemic could serve as a significant precedent – state 
policing and government be oriented, informed and instructed by science 
and scientific research. Furthermore, the very nature of science must be – 
and this could amongst other things become a highly difficult, yet relevant 
task of the state(s) – protected, and this means it must be defended as 
something that takes place in distance from economic demands and 
needs, especially from the current global financial system. The right 
lesson to learn is not that states can only help their peoples when they 
limit democracy, but rather when they protect what is crucial for the 
survival of them, from universal health care, maybe even more than just 
basic, to adequate scientific research that must be shared universally 
and of which all privatization-attempts must not only be universally 
prohibited, but also scorned (at least). The tasks of the state could 
become that of a septum separating not only science (and medicine) from 
economy, but also politics from economy. All this will certainly become 
relevant for the imminent ecological disaster we are facing, too. 
8 Cf. Davis 2020b
Now, there is, especially for (Western) philosophers, a very specific 
viral threat in all this, a viral threat of the pandemic. Notably, to finally 
have come across the one phenomenon that seems to have significance 
for the entire world and that validates one’s own theoretical perspective. 
We have seen an abundance of interpretations emerging with the 
pandemic and it may have appeared that the second seconded the first, 
ultimately proving that sometimes the business of philosophy appears 
to become manifest in interpreting the world differently and actually 
simply waiting for another occasion to do so. At times there seemed to 
be a certain dose of conceptual narcissism involved, following the logic 
that “if I do not have anything meaningful to say about this virus, my 
philosophical position might be not really worthwhile.” Others countered 
this, by emphasizing that a virus has in itself no meaning whatsoever 
and therefore it is rather indicative of a (narcissistic-hermeneutico) 
professional deformation to even embark on a search trip for it. The 
present issue of Crisis and Critique brings together an array of thinkers 
who all in their singular way deal with the effects of the virus, with how 
the pandemic was registered, with its resonances, with what kind of 
problems it potentially made visible or what kind of issues it brought to 
the fore, including the narcissistic tendency of “theory”, broadly speaking 
itself. Thereby, this issue did not invite people to simply interpret the 
inexistent deeper meaning of SARS-2, which in its viral-substance as 
its name indicates does not vary all too greatly from that of SARS-1 or 
MEARS, but to discuss what follows from it (even if the answer might 
be: nothing).9 In this sense, what you are about to read is an exercise 
in science-fiction, as we are trying to imagine in 2020 how 2020 will be 
remembered. But maybe this whole issue will one day be forgotten.
Berlin/Prishtina, November 2020
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